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t is not often that obscure 1940s antitrust legislation occupies 
headlines in the nation’s major newspapers.  However, during the 
last year, national discourse found its way to the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act as Congress reinvigorated an old and recurring question: whether 
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to repeal the insurance industry’s exemption from the federal antitrust 
laws.  The McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA) exempts the “business of 
insurance” from the federal antitrust laws to the extent it is “regulated 
by State Law”1 and does not constitute “boycott, coercion, or 
intimidation.”2  The MFA was passed in 1945 in response to the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Ass’n, which, in keeping with then-recent, expansive 
interpretations of the Commerce Clause, held that insurance 
transactions were interstate commerce.3  Were it not for the MFA, the 
Court’s opinion would have subjected the business of insurance to 
scrutiny under the federal antitrust laws for the first time. 
Since then, judicial interpretation of the statutory language has 
circumscribed the scope of the exemption, and Congress has 
occasionally revisited the durability of its mid-twentieth-century 
wisdom.  In a trilogy of opinions beginning in the late 1970s, the 
Court explicated the definition of “insurance” for purposes of the 
MFA, clarified that the involvement of certain parties was essential to 
or instructive of whether conduct was the “business” of insurance, 
and outlined the parameters of conduct constituting “boycott” that 
falls outside the exemption.4 
For its part, Congress has for many years considered the continuing 
vitality of the exemption through a number of bills proposing to 
repeal the MFA in whole or in part.5  More recently, congressional 
debate has centered on partially repealing the exemption with respect 
to the health insurance industry.  Among several differing proposals 
over the last year, identical bills were introduced in the House and the 
Senate in September 2009 (the September Bills) that would have 
repealed the MFA only to the extent it exempts bid rigging, price 
 
1 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006). 
2 Id. § 1013(b). 
3 United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944). 
4 See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982); Grp. Life & Health Ins. 
Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 
U.S. 531 (1978). 
5 See, e.g., H.R. 1081, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 618, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2401, 
109th Cong. (2005); S. 1525, 109th Cong. (2005).  For a detailed discussion of prior 
efforts to modify the MFA, see Chris Sagers, Much Ado About Possibly Pretty Little: 
McCarran-Ferguson Repeal in the Health Care Reform Effort, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
325 (2010). 
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fixing, and market allocation in the health and medical malpractice 
insurance industries.6 
Although the September Bills sought lesser reform than subsequent 
bills introduced in November 2009 and February 2010,7 they were 
significant apart from their legislative aim insofar as they provoked 
questions concerning whether bid rigging, price fixing, and market 
allocation were exempt under the MFA to begin with.8  Indeed, to the 
extent this question remains unanswered, the extent to which the 
September Bills would have altered the insurance exemption remains 
unclear. 
Bid rigging, price fixing, and market allocation by horizontal 
competitors are considered hard-core antitrust violations and are 
accorded per se treatment in the courts as such.  Unlike other alleged 
antitrust violations that are accorded rule of reason treatment, 
whereby conduct is evaluated upon balancing procompetitive and 
anticompetitive effects in a properly defined market, courts deem per 
se violations so predictably and seriously harmful to competition that 
they are considered presumptively unlawful without analysis of 
market conditions or actual effects.  Furthermore, per se offenses 
frequently earn criminal prosecution by the Antitrust Division of the 
U.S. Department of Justice. 
 
6 H.R. 3596, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1681, 111th Cong. (2009).  The House bill was 
reported by committee but never received a vote, while the Senate bill stalled upon being 
referred to committee.  In October 2009, the House passed a sweeping health care reform 
bill, including language that would have repealed the MFA in its entirety as to only the 
health insurance industry.  H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009).  The operative language was 
dropped after both Houses passed a different bill in its stead.  However, in February 2010, 
the House overwhelmingly passed yet another bill that would accomplish repeal similar to 
that contemplated in the original House health care reform bill.  H.R. 4626, 111th Cong. 
(2010).  As of this writing, that bill’s fate in the Senate remains unclear.  See Sagers, supra 
note 5, at 329. 
7 Both the November 2009 bill and the February 2010 bill would have repealed the 
MFA in its entirety as to the health insurance industry, whereas the September Bills would 
have repealed the Act only as to bid rigging, price fixing, and market allocation in the 
health insurance industry.  See Sagers, supra note 5, at 329.  However, the September Bills 
also would have impacted the medical malpractice insurance industry, whereas the 
November 2009 bill and the February 2010 bill applied only to health insurance.  Id. at 
325–29. 
8 The stated purpose of the September Bills was “[t]o ensure that health insurance 
issuers . . . cannot engage in price fixing, bid rigging, or market allocations . . . .”  S. 1681 
(emphasis added).  Because of the broad statutory language found in the MFA, it is not 
always clear whether conduct is exempt prior to careful, fact-based analysis.  See infra 
notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
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It may seem unlikely that courts would read the broad statutory 
language of the MFA to suggest that Congress sought to immunize 
conduct by health insurers that is otherwise presumptively unlawful 
and possibly criminal under the Sherman Act, without expressly 
stating as much.9  Indeed, one federal court has held that a bid-rigging 
scheme involving commercial property and casualty insurers was not 
protected by the exemption.10 
With regard to price fixing, Congress did make clear that it sought 
to immunize cooperative ratemaking practices in the insurance 
industry.  The legislative history of the MFA and the fact that it was 
passed in response to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Ass’n strongly suggest that cooperative ratemaking was to form the 
core of the statutory phrase, “business of insurance.”11  Accordingly, 
courts have held that cooperative ratemaking practices are exempt 
under the MFA.12 
Market allocation, however, remains something of an open 
question.  If Congress passes legislation removing the MFA 
exemption from health insurance, attention will certainly focus on 
whether the Blue Cross/Blue Shield (BCBS) companies, which 
together form the largest health benefits provider in the nation, are 
engaged in unlawful market allocation agreements.  Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield Association (BCBSA), the national organization that 
licenses the Blue Cross and Blue Shield trade names and symbols, has 
a history replete with statements that could support claims of market 
allocation being a fundamental strategy of BCBS companies, and in 
 
9 To be sure, Congress does sometimes exempt conduct that would otherwise be per se 
illegal and possibly criminal, but often it does so by delineating that which would be 
exempt with some specificity.  See, e.g., Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1706, 
amended by Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-258, 112 Stat. 1902 
(1998). 
10 In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., Nos. 04-5184 & 05-1079, 2006 WL 2850607, at 
*10 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2006) (concluding that defendants’ bid-rigging and steering practices 
were not the business of insurance and thus were not exempt under the MFA). 
11 See Owens v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 654 F.2d 218, 244 (3d Cir. 1981) (Sloviter, J., 
dissenting) (“‘Certainly the fixing of rates is part of this business; that is what South-
Eastern Underwriters was all about.’” (quoting SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 
(1969))). 
12 In re Workers’ Comp. Ins. Antitrust Litig., 867 F.2d 1552, 1556 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(identifying examples of cooperative ratemaking conduct that courts have held to be 
exempt, including joint use of reimbursement formulas for insurance claims, joint rate 
setting and risk classification, cooperative fixing of automobile insurance premiums, 
cooperative fixing of title insurance sellers’ charges, and cooperative fixing of agent 
commissions). 
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fact there are few examples of BCBS companies competing against 
one another like distinct manufacturers of insurance products 
normally compete.13  This might not matter significantly if the health 
insurance industry had a competitive market structure, but in most 
geographic markets, it is highly concentrated such that the absence of 
“Blue-on-Blue” competition could be costly to consumers.14 
If market allocation were not exempt, either in the event of MFA 
repeal or because the MFA is found not to protect it, the next 
questions become (1) would holding BCBS companies to an antitrust 
standard result in prohibiting such companies from agreeing not to 
enter one another’s market? and (2) can competition in the health 
insurance field be increased by this result?  As the analysis below 
demonstrates, the outcome of a challenge to BCBS companies on 
market allocation grounds is by no means preordained.  And even in 
 
13 The BCBS companies are independent corporations that are not economically 
integrated, except to the extent that each is individually bound to the applicable terms of a 
BCBSA licensing agreement.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BLUE CROSS AND BLUE 
SHIELD: EXPERIENCES OF WEAK PLANS UNDERSCORE THE ROLE OF EFFECTIVE STATE 
OVERSIGHT app. II at 28 (1994), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat3/151562.pdf.  
Pursuant to the licensing agreement, each BCBS company must submit to performance 
monitoring, participation in coordinating programs, and enumerated BCBSA membership 
standards to the extent they are enforced.  See id. at 28–33; see also id. at 14 (noting that 
from 1987 through 1990, twenty member plans failed to comply with BCBSA financial 
standards for at least two consecutive years, but from 1982 through April 1994, the 
BCBSA terminated only one trademark license for this reason).  However, in most 
respects the Blues plans operate independently, at least to the extent that they are 
separately owned.  Id. at app. III at 34 (“Our study found that Blues plans differ 
considerably in organization, operations, and regulation.”).  Furthermore, the BCBSA 
governance structure seems set up largely to allow the individual BCBS companies to act 
collectively, rather than to create an independent authority overseeing the plans.  See id. at 
app. II at 24–25.  
As members of the [BCBSA], Blues plans collectively govern the [BCBSA’s] 
affairs pursuant to written bylaws.  Under these bylaws, the [BCBSA] is 
governed by a board of directors.  The board of directors consists of the CEOs of 
most plans and the [BCBSA] president.  . . .  For practical purposes, meetings of 
the [BCBSA’s] board of directors and its membership comprise largely the same 
individuals. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
14 See Health Insurance Industry Enforcement Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 3596 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 116–35 (2009) (statement of David Balto, Senior Fellow, Center for 
American Progress); COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY 
OF U.S. MARKETS, 2009 UPDATE, available at http://www.ama-assn.org 
/ama1/pub/upload/mm/363/chi-09-web.pdf (“We find that 99 percent of [Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas] are highly concentrated.  In 92 percent of the MSAs, one or more 
insurers had a share of 30 percent or greater, while 54 percent of the markets had an 
insurer with a share of at least 50 percent.”). 
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the event of a successful challenge, yet another question arises: is 
there a practical remedy that would require the companies to go up 
against one another as head-on competitors? 
No court has categorically classified insurer market allocation as 
either within or outside the scope of the MFA exemption.  Two state 
attorneys general and one private plaintiff have challenged individual 
insurer market allocation schemes on federal antitrust grounds and 
been met with an MFA exemption defense.15  The three combined 
challenges yielded only two federal court opinions, and they split.  In 
Garot Anderson Marketing, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United 
of Wisconsin, the Northern District of Illinois held that a challenged 
market allocation scheme was not exempt under the MFA.16  In 
Maryland v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, the District of Maryland 
allowed that a challenged market allocation scheme could be exempt 
on a better evidentiary showing, but it was not prepared to rule at the 
time.17  The remaining challenge, Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n v. 
Community Mutual Insurance Co., was resolved by the parties prior 
to a judicial decision.18 
In Blue Cross and Community Mutual, the attorneys general in 
Maryland and Ohio in fact challenged the BCBS market allocation 
scheme in particular, alleging in nearly identical claims that the 
national scheme’s deployment in their respective states constituted a 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.19  Because of the Blue 
Cross court’s equivocal holding and the absence of an opinion in 
Community Mutual, whether the BCBS market allocation scheme is 
 
15 See Garot Anderson Mktg., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 772 F. Supp. 
1054 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (private plaintiff); Maryland v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 620 
F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1985) (Maryland Attorney General); 5 HEALTH CARE & ANTITRUST 
LAW app. E96 (John Miles ed., 2010), available at Westlaw HTHATRL APP E96 
(discussing Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n v. Cmty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. C85-7872 (N.D. 
Ohio 1985) (Ohio Attorney General)).  Two other private plaintiffs have also challenged 
conduct that they deemed market allocation, but in both cases, the court recharacterized 
their allegations and found them to be protected as the business of insurance.  In Owens v. 
Aetna Life & Casualty Co., the majority recharacterized the conduct as cooperating in the 
decision to file a rating schedule.  Owens, 654 F.2d at 232.  In Slagle v. ITT Hartford, the 
court recharacterized the conduct as price fixing by concerted refusal to deal.  Slagle v. 
ITT Hartford, 102 F.3d 494, 496 (11th Cir. 1996). 
16 Garot Anderson Mktg., Inc., 772 F. Supp. at 1063. 
17 Blue Cross, 620 F. Supp. at 922. 
18 5 HEALTH CARE & ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 15 (discussing Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Ass’n v. Cmty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. C85-7872 (N.D. Ohio 1985)). 
19 See id. (“The goal in each case was to foster statewide competition with respect to 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield insurance products.”). 
STUTZ 3/31/2011  3:41 PM 
2011] Market Allocation in the Health Insurance Industry 891 
indeed exempt from federal antitrust scrutiny under the MFA remains 
unclear. 
This Article examines the scope of the MFA under existing 
Supreme Court precedent and reviews the sparse case law addressing 
the MFA’s applicability to market allocation schemes in the insurance 
industry, including the BCBS market allocation scheme.  This Article 
concludes that whether any market allocation scheme is exempt is a 
close, fact-specific question that courts will not answer in the abstract.  
On any set of facts, insurers will have considerable leeway in 
attempting to prove that a given market allocation scheme should be 
treated as the business of insurance and thus exempt if regulated by 
state law.  A clear determination that the BCBS market allocation 
scheme is not exempt, or congressional action to repeal the MFA as to 
the health insurance industry, would remove a primary obstacle to a 
challenge of the scheme, but it is not clear whether this would affect 
competitive dynamics among BCBS companies. 
I 
BACKGROUND 
A.  The BCBSA, the BCBS Companies, and Allocation of Markets 
For several decades, BCBS health insurance companies, facilitated 
by the BCBSA, have operated nationwide under agreements not to 
compete in each other’s geographical territories.  They have done so 
openly, and the practice has not escaped U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) or Federal Trade Commission (FTC) attention.  Indeed, the 
federal antitrust enforcement agencies have evidenced their awareness 
of the BCBS territorial restraints on multiple occasions,20 though no 
focused investigation or action has resulted, nor has either agency 
publicly challenged the practice as anticompetitive. 
The origins of the BCBS territorial restraints are perhaps traceable 
to the benign fact that early BCBS plans were largely local, prepaid 
hospital and physician services plans.  As such, each naturally catered 
to geographically distinct customers.  However, conscious division of 
territories likely was not purely an accident of circumstance that 
evolved over time.  In 1936, the Committee on Hospital Services of 
 
20 EXHIBIT A: APRIL 1985 BCBSA SUBMISSION TO JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REGARDING 
ENFORCEABILITY OF GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS 24–25 (1985) (on file with author) 
(referencing inquiries made into territorial restrictions through subpoenas and document 
requests issued to the BCBSA or BCBS member plans by the FTC or the Antitrust 
Division of the DOJ during the late 1960s and late 1970s). 
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the American Hospital Association, a precursor to the BCBSA, 
adopted seven principles governing its philosophy toward nonprofit 
health care plans.  One such principle was to “establish[] plans [that] 
were not in competition with other plans.”21 
As was true during the first half of the twentieth century, modern 
BCBS plans do not formally agree with each other not to enter one 
another’s market.  Rather, they achieve territorial divisions through 
the BCBSA, which licenses the Blue Cross and Blue Shield trade 
names and symbols individually to member plans.  Pursuant to these 
licensing agreements, and as a condition of affiliation, plans agree not 
to compete with other plans within prescribed service areas.22 
Several considerations would complicate an antitrust analysis of 
this arrangement.  Most immediately, there is likely to be 
disagreement over whether the territorial restraints should properly be 
viewed as horizontal or vertical, which might affect whether they are 
properly reviewed under the per se standard or the rule of reason 
standard.  Even if they are properly categorized as horizontal, the rule 
of reason standard may nonetheless be appropriate.23 
In a rule of reason analysis, the BCBSA and BCBS companies can 
offer several arguments as to procompetitive effects.  For example, 
the BCBSA has argued that allowing member plans to compete head-
to-head within service areas would create confusion among 
consumers, who would have to distinguish between different 
companies offering different products using similar or nearly identical 
trade names and symbols.24  The ensuing confusion might threaten to 
 
21 ODIN W. ANDERSON, BLUE CROSS SINCE 1929: ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE PUBLIC 
TRUST 40 (1975). 
22 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 13, at 28.  
To use the Blue Cross and Blue Shield names and trademarks, each Blues plan 
must sign a license agreement with the Association.  . . .  The license agreement 
restricts plans from using the trademark outside their prescribed service area to 
prevent competition among plans using the Blue Cross and Blue Shield names 
and trademarks. 
Id. 
23 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broad. Music, 
Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 
792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
24 EXHIBIT A: APRIL 1985 BCBSA SUBMISSION TO JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REGARDING 
ENFORCEABILITY OF GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS, supra note 20, at 10–13.  BCBSA has 
also suggested that this confusion would be exacerbated by a common consumer 
misperception that BCBS plans together form a single entity.  Id.  If this is true, 
segregating the “Blue Cross” and “Blue Shield” names and symbols, or otherwise 
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dilute the value of the BCBSA’s intellectual property to the extent 
head-to-head competition among BCBS companies would yield 
multiple performance standards in a given service area.25  With 
multiple performance standards, the BCBSA has suggested, would 
come loss of consumer loyalty, trust, and goodwill attaching to the 
BCBS name and symbols.26  The territorial restraints arguably 
preempt this loss. 
Allocating geographic territories can also work to prevent a “free 
rider” effect, whereby a newly entering BCBS plan would unfairly 
take advantage of the advertising and promotional activities of an 
existing BCBS plan in a given territory.27  Courts have recognized 
“that reasonable territorial arrangements in trademark license 
agreements serve several legitimate trademark objectives consistent 
with the antitrust laws,” and BCBSA might argue from its perspective 
that territorial arrangements are ancillary restraints to the primary 
purpose of protecting its trade names.28 
However, if these potential points of contention by the BCBSA can 
be successfully challenged, there is evidence that Blue-on-Blue 
competition would inure to the benefit of consumers.  For example, in 
central Pennsylvania, which is one of the rare places where Blues 
have been competing with one another since 2002, the State Insurance 
Commissioner noted upon concluding a twenty-one-month 
investigation of a proposed merger of two BCBS plans that “[o]ur 
experts concluded that [the central Pennsylvania] region produced the 
best results for consumers and this was backed up by the 
overwhelming weight of testimony from providers, competitors, 
consumer groups, and others who submitted comments.”29  He further 
noted that his office would have considered allowing the merger if 
expanded Blue-on-Blue competition could be made a condition of 
approval, but the participating companies had refused.30 
 




27 Id. at 13–15.  This problem is likewise exacerbated by the “single entity” consumer 
misperception, if it exists. 
28 Id. at 10; see also Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, 542 
F.2d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 1976). 
29 STATEMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA INSURANCE COMMISSIONER JOEL ARIO ON 
HIGHMARK AND IBC CONSOLIDATION 3 (2009), available at http://www.portal 
.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_2_496354_0_0_18/Statement_final.pdf. 
30 Id. 
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B.  Scope of the MFA Exemption 
The MFA introduces a threshold inquiry before any court would 
reach the balancing of competitive effects in a hypothetical federal 
antitrust challenge to the national market allocation scheme of BCBS 
companies.  The MFA provides that the Sherman Act, the Clayton 
Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act “shall be applicable to 
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not 
regulated by State Law.”31  Thus, any form of insurer market 
allocation, including the BCBS national market allocation scheme, 
would be exempt from scrutiny under the federal antitrust laws if it 
constitutes “the business of insurance” and is “regulated by State 
Law.”32 
The Supreme Court has identified three criteria for determining 
whether insurer conduct constitutes the business of insurance.  The 
practice (1) must have the effect of transferring or spreading a 
policyholder’s risk, (2) must be integral to the policy relationship 
between the insurer and the insured, and (3) should be limited to 
entities within the insurance industry.33 
Insurer conduct is sufficiently regulated by state law for purposes 
of maintaining the exemption if a state has passed any law purporting 
to regulate the conduct at issue and the actors are within the 
jurisdictional reach of that state.34  As Professor Herbert Hovenkamp 
has explained, “It makes no difference that the state regulation is not 
actively enforced, or that the state agency simply rubber stamps the 
insurance companies’ requests.  If a statute exists, and the relevant 
agency or commissioner has jurisdiction over the practice under 
scrutiny, the [state regulation] requirement is met.”35 
In the next section, this Article examines the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the MFA’s statutory language in the context of 
 
31 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006). 
32 Because the “boycott, coercion, or intimidation” exception to the exemption is not 
relevant to discussing the MFA’s impact on market allocation by insurers, it is left out of 
the MFA analysis in this Article.  See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 
(1993). 
33 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE 730–31 (3d ed. 1999) (citing Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 
U.S. 119, 129 (1982), and Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 
(1979)). 
34 Id. at 732. 
35 Id. 
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insurer market allocation, including the BCBS national market 
allocation scheme. 
II 
INSURER MARKET ALLOCATION AND COURTS’ READING OF THE 
MFA 
Judicial interpretation of the MFA has created hierarchies of 
significance among the components of an MFA exemption inquiry, 
regardless of the insurer conduct at issue.  With respect to the two 
broad statutory requirements—the “business of insurance” 
requirement and the “regulated by state law” requirement—the former 
is more significant than the latter.  This is reflected in courts’ having 
often found the “business of insurance” requirement determinative of 
whether conduct is exempt,36 while the “regulated by State Law” 
requirement has evolved to become easily met.37  And within the 
“business of insurance” requirement, there are further hierarchies of 
significance.  The first two of the Supreme Court’s criteria for 
satisfying the statutory definition are more significant than the third.  
This is reflected in the fact that conduct can fail to be solely among 
entities within the insurance industry and survive the exemption 
inquiry, while conduct apparently never survives if it does not 
accomplish the transfer or spreading of risk or is not integral to the 
policy relationship between insurer and insured.38 
Case law addressing whether market allocation is exempt under the 
MFA has conformed to this pattern.  Three court opinions have 
analyzed the issue, and each focused primarily on the business of 
insurance requirement, particularly the first two of the Supreme 
Court’s three “business of insurance” criteria.  The opinions suggest 
that courts remain reluctant to rule categorically on whether market 
 
36 See, e.g., Pireno, 458 U.S. at 134; Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. at 232–33; In re Ins. 
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 361 (3d Cir. 2010); Garot Anderson Mktg., Inc. 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 772 F. Supp. 1054, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Maryland 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 620 F. Supp. 907, 914–15 (D. Md. 1985).  The 
definition of the “business of insurance” has also generated extensive case law outside the 
antitrust context.  See Susan Beth Farmer, Competition and Regulation in the Insurance 
Sector: Reassessing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 89 OR. L. REV. 915, 937–38 (2011). 
37 See infra Part II.B. 
38 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LEGAL PRINCIPLES DEFINING THE SCOPE OF 
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST EXEMPTION FOR INSURANCE 4–5 (2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/other/304474.pdf. 
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allocation is exempt.  Rather, the particular facts and circumstances of 
a market allocation scheme will dictate the outcome. 
A.  The “Business of Insurance” Requirement 
1.  Transferring or Spreading Policyholder Risk 
Because the text of the MFA does not make any attempt to 
delineate the “business of insurance,” the Supreme Court has had to 
ascribe meaning to the phrase, and it has identified the transfer or 
spreading of risk as an “indispensable characteristic” of that 
meaning.39  This first of three requirements under the Court’s holding 
in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno—that the practice in 
question must have the effect of transferring or spreading risk—is 
ostensibly the Court’s answer as to how to define the term 
“insurance” in the MFA context.  According to the Court, the quality 
of transferring or spreading risk is what separates insurance from 
similar but distinct endeavors: “‘It is characteristic of insurance that a 
number of risks are accepted, some of which involve losses, and that 
such losses are spread over all the risks so as to enable the insurer to 
accept each risk at a slight fraction of the possible liability upon it.’”40 
If it is a seemingly clear and meaningful criterion in the abstract, in 
reality, the “transfer or spreading of risk” is usually elusive and 
intangible.  It is perhaps only directly accomplished in a fleeting 
moment during the execution of a policy agreement.  Because very 
little activity can squarely fit such a description, the inquiry often 
devolves into whether the activity in question is sufficiently 
connected to the transfer or spreading of risk to warrant a finding that 
Congress intended that it be exempt, all else being equal.41  Courts 
have held that whether an activity, including a market allocation 
scheme, is sufficiently connected to the transfer or spreading of risk is 
of necessity a fact-specific inquiry.42 
 
39 Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. at 212. 
40 Id. at 211 (quoting 1 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1:3 (2d 
ed. 1959)); see also SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959). 
41 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Mfrs. Hanover Consumer Servs., Inc., 567 F. Supp. 992, 
994 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (“The first criterion is whether the practice is to spread the risk.  The 
answer to this inquiry depends largely upon how one defines the ‘practice.’”); see also In 
re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d at 356 (“As the disagreement between the 
majority and dissent in Owens illustrates, the precise characterization of the defendants’ 
conduct can be dispositive.”). 
42 See Owens v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 654 F.2d 218, 247 (3d Cir. 1981) (“The tests 
applied by the Supreme Court in its two recent opinions interpreting the McCarran-
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Maryland v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n is the only federal 
court opinion involving a direct antitrust challenge to the BCBS 
national market allocation scheme met with an MFA defense, and the 
court labored over whether the scheme sufficiently accomplished the 
transfer or spreading of risk in satisfaction of the first Pireno 
criterion.43  The State of Maryland brought suit against (1) Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield of Maryland, Inc. (BCBSM), an insurance provider 
licensed in Maryland; (2) Group Hospitalization and Medical 
Services, Inc. (GHI), another insurance provider licensed in 
Maryland; and (3) the BCBSA.44  BCBSM and GHI were BCBSA 
member plans.45  The State alleged, among other things, that the 
BCBSA’s licensing agreements with BCBSM and GHI impermissibly 
allocated the insurance market in Maryland in violation of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act.46  The defendants “admitted the existence of the 
territorial allocation agreements”47 but submitted that the agreements 
were “exempt from federal antitrust scrutiny under the [MFA].”48  
Ruling on cross-motions for partial summary judgment on whether 
the MFA barred the State’s claim, the court held that material factual 
issues remained for trial as to whether the BCBS market allocation 
scheme satisfied the first Pireno criterion.49 
The evidence submitted by both sides on whether allocating 
markets accomplishes the transfer or spreading of risk belies the 
clarity of this criterion in defining the business of insurance.  BCBSM 
 
Ferguson Act, St. Paul and Royal Drug, ‘are fact-specific rather than categorical in nature; 
both will usually require full factual development before they can be applied 
definitively.’” (quoting Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining the 
Scope of Exemptions, Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 UCLA L. 
REV. 265, 288 (1979))). 
43 See Maryland v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 620 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1985).  
A nearly identical case challenging the BCBS national market allocation scheme was 
brought in the Northern District of Ohio, but it was resolved by the parties prior to a 
judicial decision.  See 5 HEALTH CARE & ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 15 (discussing 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n v. Cmty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. C85-7872 (N.D. Ohio 1985)); 
infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. 
44 Blue Cross, 620 F. Supp. at 909. 
45 Id. 
46 Id.  The defendants had agreed that GHI would operate in Prince George’s County 
and Montgomery County, while BCBSM would operate throughout the rest of the state.  
Id. 
47 Id.  Indeed, BCBSA asserted that it imposed the exclusive service areas on the 
Maryland and D.C. plans and other member plans as a condition for approval of the right 
to use the Blue Cross name and symbols.  Id. at 912. 
48 Id. at 909. 
49 Id. at 917, 922. 
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submitted the affidavit of its director of actuarial research and rating, 
who stated that “BCBSM considers the geographic locations of the 
employment groups it insures in determining appropriate rate 
levels.”50  He further stated that BCBSM was not familiar “with the 
health care costs charged in the D.C. metropolitan area” allocated to 
GHI and speculated that “if BCBSM were to market in the GHI area, 
it would have to charge higher rates.”51  GHI’s expert, its vice 
president for actuarial services, stated in his affidavit that “provider 
charges and patient utilization vary among geographic areas . . . [and] 
[p]rovider charges and utilization rates determine insurance rates.”52  
BCBSA offered the affidavit of its chief actuary, who asserted that 
“the Blue Cross plans’ geographic limits enable them to excel in 
ratemaking . . . [and] the geographic limits allow the plans to develop 
intimate familiarity with the utilization patterns of their own 
communities and the provider charges common in those 
communities.”53 
Conversely, the State’s expert, an assistant professor of actuarial 
science at the Wharton School’s insurance department, noted that 
“there have been incursions by both plans into areas across the 
[territorial] boundary and that these incursions demonstrate the plans 
saw no underwriting or ratemaking barrier to marketing in each 
other’s areas” and further that “the boundary is unrelated to insurance 
and is the result of a marketing decision not to compete for 
customers.”54  The State’s expert also noted that the two plans 
observed the territorial boundary with respect to administrative 
services only (ASO) contracts, wherein claims are administered and 
paid by the insurance company, but the “claimants” are self-insured, 
and the group of claimants ultimately reimburses the insurance 
company for all claims paid plus administrative expenses.55  The 
State argued that “ASO contracts do not constitute the business of 
insurance because the insurance company assumes no risk.”56 
Clearly, none of the parties could speak directly to whether the 
market allocation scheme actually accomplished the transfer or 
 
50 Id. at 910. 
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spreading of risk, so they reverted to “one-off” arguments that were 
designed to create (in the defendant’s case) or sever (in the State’s 
case) a link between market allocation and risk spreading.  For their 
part, the defendants sought to intertwine the territorial allocations 
with the practice of cooperative ratemaking, which is a form of joint 
activity clearly recognized to be part of transferring risk and squarely 
within the business of insurance.57  The State, meanwhile, sought to 
distinguish the market allocation scheme from the practice of 
cooperative ratemaking, alluding to cross-territorial incursions that 
imply that market allocation is ancillary to cooperative ratemaking 
and to the fact that territorial boundaries were observed for activities 
outside the business of insurance, which suggested that they were 
foremost a means of avoiding competition. 
The court elaborated on the parties’ arguments: 
 The State asserts that defendants’ market allocation scheme is 
unrelated to underwriting or ratemaking because the particular 
territories have no actuarial relevance. . . .  The State asserts that 
actuarial relevance is required to meet the [transfer or spreading of 
risk] prong of the Pireno “business of insurance” test.  It 
acknowledges that there are no cases with substantially similar facts 
in which courts have found the exemption unavailable . . . .58 
 . . .  The State submits that most insurance activities which are 
unique to the industry involve risk spreading or underwriting.  . . .  
The State submits that market allocation is not unique to the 
industry and that it does not involve risk spreading.59 
 Defendants disagree with the State for several reasons.  First, 
they submit that underwriting considerations do not have to underlie 
a challenged policy in order for the exemption to apply.  They point 
out that the statutory language exempts the “business of insurance” 
not the “business of underwriting.”  Second, they argue that 
actuarial relevance of the particular boundary is not required.  They 
 
57 See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982); Owens v. Aetna 
Life & Cas. Co., 654 F.2d 218, 225–26 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[D]eciding upon rating 
classification differences between individual policies and group marketing plans, either 
individually or jointly through a rating bureau” is “[clearly] the business of insurance.”).  
[I]n enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, “the primary concern of both 
representatives of the insurance industry and the Congress was that cooperative 
ratemaking efforts be exempt from the antitrust laws.”  . . .  This was so because 
of “the widespread view that it [was] very difficult to underwrite risks in an 
informed and responsible way without intra-industry cooperation.”  
Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129 (quoting Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 
205, 221–22 (1979)). 
58 Blue Cross, 620 F. Supp. at 914. 
59 Id. at 915. 
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submit that territorial allocation is always related to risk spreading 
because it defines the pool of insureds.  Whether the particular pool 
created is optimal should not be the concern of a court.  The 
caselaw merely requires a relationship to risk spreading.  Finally, if 
the court finds that Pireno does require that a challenged territorial 
allocation have actuarial relevance, the defendants contend that the 
particular territories at issue here have actuarial significance.60 
In weighing the arguments, noting in fairness that the BCBSA’s 
practices were longstanding, the court ultimately concluded that “[i]t 
is difficult to reconcile the Blues’ argument with the [Supreme 
Court’s] admonition in Pireno and Royal Drug that contractual 
arrangements with health care providers designed solely to reduce 
costs are not sufficient to meet the business of insurance 
requirement.”61  Although it stopped short of granting the State’s 
motion for partial summary judgment on the MFA issue because the 
court believed the parties’ affidavits raised material factual issues for 
trial, it held that, “in order to meet the [transfer or spreading of risk] 
Pireno requirement the defendants must show the challenged 
territorial allocation is related positively to underwriting and 
ratemaking; that is, that exclusive geographic territories directly 
facilitate risk spreading and transfer through the provision of 
insurance.”62  The court added, “[t]his holding is consistent with the 
State’s position.”63 
In Garot Anderson Marketing, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
United, another federal court, under different circumstances, went 
further than the Blue Cross court and ruled that a market allocation 
scheme was not the business of insurance.64  Although the challenged 
market allocation scheme in Garot Anderson involved two BCBS 
insurers, it did not concern the BCBS national market allocation 
scheme.  The BCBSA was not named as a defendant, and the 
challenged allocation of markets was not achieved through the 
BCBSA licensing agreement.  Here, the two BCBS insurers were 
accused of violating section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring 
directly with one another to allocate the market for one particular 
insurance plan.65 
 
60 Id. at 914–15. 
61 Id. at 917. 
62 Id. (emphasis added). 
63 Id. 
64 Garot Anderson Mktg., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 772 F. Supp. 1054, 
1063 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
65 Id. at 1057. 
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The Midwest Farm Program was an insurance plan marketed to 
Illinois farmers that was underwritten by Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
United of Wisconsin (BCBS-WI) but administered by Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield of Rockford (Illinois) (BCBS-IL) pursuant to an 
agreement between the insurers.66  After BCBS-IL merged with 
another Illinois health insurance company, Health Care Services 
Corporation (HCSC), representatives from HCSC and BCBS-WI met 
to discuss problems with the Midwest Farm Program.67  They then 
agreed to terminate the plan to avoid competition between the 
Midwest Farm Program and other comparable plans.68 
Judge Roszkowski of the Northern District of Illinois needed only 
one paragraph to condemn the defendants’ argument that their 
division of markets was exempt under the MFA.69  Without reaching 
the remainder of the inquiry, the court held that defendants’ conduct 
was not the business of insurance because it failed to meet both of the 
first two Pireno criteria.70  In ruling that the defendants’ conduct did 
not have the effect of transferring or spreading risk, the court noted 
only that the defendants had failed to make any showing that 
terminating the Midwest Farm Program shifted subscribers’ risk from 
the subscribers to either defendant.  With no evidentiary showing at 
all, as compared to the robust expert testimony put forth by the 
defendants in Blue Cross, the court ruled easily that the market 
allocation scheme in question failed to meet the first Pireno criterion. 
The Third Circuit also had occasion to address whether a market 
allocation scheme accomplished risk spreading in Owens v. Aetna Life 
& Casualty Co.71  In Owens, the plaintiff was an insurance broker 
who accused Aetna and certain affiliates of committing multiple 
Sherman Act violations, including withdrawal from the medical 




68 Id.  The court could infer an agreement in part from a letter from BCBS-WI to 
HCSC, in which a BCBS-WI representative stated,  
[T]here has been some concern by your marketing staff that the Midwest Farm 
Program . . . is competing with other Illinois Blue Cross programs in the 
Northern Illinois area.  . . .  In an attempt to eliminate the competitive nature of 
this program, we would propose to transfer the existing 831 subscribers now 
enrolled . . . . 
Id. 
69 See id. at 1063. 
70 Id. 
71 Owens v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 654 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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agreement with other insurance companies.72  The district court 
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding 
broadly that the MFA was a valid defense to all of the plaintiff’s 
federal antitrust allegations.73  While the majority affirmed on the 
alternative ground that the plaintiff had failed to present any evidence 
from which an inference of concerted action by defendants could be 
drawn,74 dissenting Judge Sloviter took the majority to task for 
affirming on grounds that were neither cited by the district court nor 
argued by the defendants.  She further chastised the majority for 
skirting “the difficult legal issue” of whether the MFA exempted 
plaintiffs’ market division allegations, “a question of first impression” 
that she believed was decided on an inadequate legal basis.75 
Although her dissenting opinion had no impact on the outcome in 
Owens, Judge Sloviter undertook a detailed analysis of whether 
market allocation should be exempt under the MFA, including 
whether it had the effect of transferring or spreading risk.  She 
concluded that a market division agreement of the sort contemplated 
by Aetna did not: 
It appears . . . unlikely that [in passing the MFA] Congress thought 
it was protecting agreements whereby an insurance company would 
completely withdraw from writing one type of insurance within the 
state.  Aetna’s argument seems to turn protection of the “business of 
insurance” into the “business of non-insurance.” 
 . . . . 
 . . . An agreement whereby a prior competitor leaves the market 
entirely entails an avoidance of risk by the departing company 
rather than a spreading of risk, which the Royal Drug Court held to 
be a “critical determinant.”  In relating the “business of insurance” 
to risk spreading, the Court stated, “there is an important distinction 
between risk underwriting and risk reduction.”  It would follow that 
complete risk avoidance is not encompassed within the exemption. 
 . . . When the McCarran-Ferguson Act was originally debated, 
those who favored broad exemption from the Sherman Act 
proposed that there should be specific enumeration of the practices 
which would be exempt from the antitrust laws.  . . .  Although 
these proposals were defeated in favor of a narrower exemption, the 
conspicuous absence from such proposals of . . . division of 
markets, and withdrawal from markets suggests that these were not 
deemed to be activities meriting protection.76 
 
72 Id. at 220–21. 
73 The district court opinion was not published. 
74 Owens, 654 F.2d at 233. 
75 Id. at 236–37. 
76 Id. at 242–43 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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The dissent seemed to be speaking categorically in noting broadly 
that an insurer who leaves a market avoids risk, rather than spreads it.  
Despite these strong words, however, Judge Sloviter did not go so far 
as to categorically condemn all market allocation as outside the scope 
of the MFA exemption.  Believing the lower court was erroneous in 
de facto concluding that Aetna’s particular market division scheme 
accomplished risk spreading, she nonetheless stated: 
I would be reluctant to suggest that no agreement between insurance 
companies which may result in withdrawal from a market can ever 
be the business of insurance, because “[w]e do not know enough of 
the economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements 
emerge to be certain.” . . .  Aetna should have the opportunity to 
make a convincing showing that the realities of the insurance 
business support a conclusion that joint action with regard to 
geographic areas of coverage or types of insurance offered is of the 
same genre as joint action such as pooling of risks or joint 
underwriting which are concededly the business of insurance.  
Aetna may be able to show that because of the special 
characteristics of the medical malpractice insurance industry, 
division of markets for such insurance is necessitated by the same 
considerations that underlie granting an exemption for other joint 
action.77 
Ultimately, whether it is possible for insurance companies to make 
a showing that market allocation is positively related to risk spreading 
is an open question, at least in the District of Maryland and likely in 
the Third Circuit.  In the Northern District of Illinois, a market 
allocation scheme by itself is not sufficiently related to risk spreading 
absent any evidence to the contrary.  At a minimum, the opinions 
suggest that insurers will have to prove that any allocation of markets 
at least has “actuarial significance” or “actuarial relevance” to have 
the effect of transferring or spreading risk. 
2.  Between the Insurer and the Insured 
If the transfer or spreading of risk is the Supreme Court’s surrogate 
for the term “insurance” in the phrase “business of insurance,” the 
Court’s second Pireno requirement, that the activity in question be 
integral to the policy relationship between insurer and insured, 
attempts to clarify just what “business” is the “business of insurance.”  
In Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., the Court 
 
77 Id. at 244 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)). 
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noted that the relationship between insurer and insured is “commonly 
understood” to be central to the business of insurance.78  It explained: 
In enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress was concerned 
with: “The relationship between insurer and insured, the type of 
policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and 
enforcement—these were the core of the ‘business of insurance.’  
Undoubtedly, other activities of insurance companies relate so 
closely to their status as reliable insurers that they too must be 
placed in the same class.  But whatever the exact scope of the 
statutory term, it is clear where the focus was—it was on the 
relationship between the insurance company and the 
policyholder.”79 
Put another way, the statutory language exempts only the business of 
insurance and not any business in which an insurance company 
happens to engage.80 
Royal Drug involved a group of pharmacies that sued Blue Shield 
of Texas, alleging that the insurer had fixed prices upon entering into 
agreements with other pharmacies for the provision of prescription 
drugs to Blue Shield of Texas policyholders.81  In discussing whether 
the pharmacy agreements were between the insurer and the insured, 
the Court stated that “[t]he Pharmacy Agreements are not ‘between 
insurer and insured.’  They are separate contractual arrangements 
between Blue Shield and pharmacies engaged in the sale and 
distribution of goods and services other than insurance.”82  However, 
Blue Shield argued that “nonetheless the Pharmacy Agreements so 
closely affect the ‘reliability, interpretation, and enforcement’ of the 
insurance contract and ‘relate so closely to their status as reliable 
insurers’ as to fall within the exempted area.”83 
The Court rejected Blue Shield’s argument but not purely on the 
basis of contractual form.  Discounting the fact that only the insurer 
and not the insured was a party to the pharmacy agreements, it 
emphasized instead that,  
 
78 Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 215 (1979). 
79 Id. at 215–16 (quoting SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969)). 
80 Id. at 217. 
81 Id. at 207.  Although Royal Drug and Pireno, discussed infra, are price-fixing cases 
and do not involve market allocation, their facts are nonetheless useful in understanding 
the “integral part of the policy relationship between insurer and insured” criterion in the 
market allocation context. 
82 Id. at 216. 
83 Id. 
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[a]t the most, [Blue Shield has] demonstrated that the Pharmacy 
Agreements result in cost savings to Blue Shield which may be 
reflected in lower premiums if the cost savings are passed on to 
policyholders.  But, in that sense, every business decision made by 
an insurance company has some impact on its reliability, its 
ratemaking, and its status as a reliable insurer.84   
And as the Court alluded, business decisions by insurance companies 
are not always the business of insurance.85 
In Pireno, on analogous facts, the Court reiterated this reasoning.  
Where the plaintiff, a chiropractor, sued an insurer alleging price 
fixing by way of the insurer’s reliance on a peer review committee to 
establish the reasonable and customary fees charged by chiropractors 
generally, the Court held that the insurer’s use of the peer review 
committee was too far removed from the relationship between insurer 
and insured.86  The Court explained that, regarding agreements like 
those in Royal Drug and here, such decisions are entirely the insurer’s 
and “a matter of indifference to the policyholder, whose only concern 
is whether his claim is paid, not why it is paid.”87 
As in Royal Drug, [the insurer had shown], at the most, that the 
challenged peer review practices result in “cost savings to [the 
insurer] which may be reflected in lower premiums if the cost 
savings are passed on to policyholders” . . . [but] [t]o grant the 
practices [an] exemption on such a showing “would be plainly 
contrary to the statutory language, which exempts the ‘business of 
insurance’ and not the ‘business of insurance companies.’”88 
The upshot of the Court’s reasoning in Royal Drug and Pireno is 
that market allocation agreements would not necessarily fail the 
second Pireno requirement—that the activity in question be integral 
to the policy relationship between insurer and insured—even if the 
parties to such agreements were entirely conspiring insurance 
companies, and not policyholders.  However, if a given market 
allocation agreement is viewed as an insurer cost-savings measure 
that does not inure to the rights of the insured, then such an agreement 
may well be outside the scope of the exemption. 
In Maryland v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, the District of 
Maryland had to wrestle with this question in the context of the BCBS 
 
84 Id. at 216–17. 
85 Id. at 217. 
86 Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 134 (1982). 
87 Id. at 132. 
88 Id. (quoting Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. at 216–17). 
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national market allocation scheme.  The State argued that market 
allocation is not an integral part of the policy relationship between 
insurer and insured and that, “to meet this criterion, a practice must 
involve the type of coverage or benefits available to an insured or 
insurance rates.  A tangential relationship to the insured/insurer 
relationship that does not affect a benefit conferred is insufficient.”89  
The defendants countered that any suit alleging antitrust injury to the 
insured satisfies the second Pireno criterion and that “territorial 
allocation goes to the core of the relationship between the insured and 
the insurer because it determines to whom the insurer will offer a 
policy.”90 
The court rejected the defendants’ argument.  It explained, “The 
court believes the decision not to market at all in a particular 
geographic area is one step removed from the aspects of the 
insured/insurer relationship . . . .  Accordingly, it does not believe 
defendants have demonstrated that the exclusive marketing areas meet 
the criterion.”91  However, just as with the parties’ arguments on 
whether market allocation effectuates the transfer or spreading of risk, 
the court sided with the State but refused to rule.  The court 
continued, “[t]he defendants also suggest that the exclusive marketing 
areas have an impact on insurance rates which in turn affect the 
insured/insurer relationship.  There is both contradictory and 
insufficient evidence on this point for the granting of summary 
judgment.”92  Much like the Owens dissent’s risk-spreading analysis 
on the first Pireno criterion, the court seemed too committed to fact-
based, case-by-case analysis to allow for a categorical classification 
of market allocation as integral or not integral to the policy 
relationship between insurer and insured. 
On distinguishable facts in Garot Anderson Marketing, Inc. v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield United, the Northern District of Illinois was 
comfortable ruling that the market allocation scheme in question was 
 
89 Maryland v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 620 F. Supp. 907, 917–18 (D. Md. 
1985). 
90 Id. at 918. 
91 Id.; cf. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., Nos. 04-5184 & 05-1079, 2006 WL 
2850607, at *10 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2006) (holding that defendants’ bid-rigging and steering 
practices were not the business of insurance and thus were not exempt under the MFA 
because, among other things, “the challenged practices are, at most, only tangentially 
related to the relationship between an insurer and insured . . . [and] are not an ‘integral 
part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured’” (quoting Pireno, 458 
U.S. at 129)). 
92 Blue Cross, 620 F. Supp. at 918. 
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not integral to the policy relationship between insurer and insured.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the agreement between 
the two defendants was “the [primary] conduct at issue,” whereas the 
relationship between subscribers and Blue Cross-WI was 
“secondary.”93  Importantly, the defendants in Garot Anderson 
apparently did not argue, as the defendants in Blue Cross did, that 
their market allocation scheme impacted ratemaking, which in turn 
impacted the insurer-insured relationship.  It was this argument that 
prevented the Blue Cross court from definitively ruling on the second 
Pireno criterion. 
3.  Limited to Entities Within the Insurance Industry 
The third and final Pireno criterion, that the activity in question 
should be limited to entities within the insurance industry, is less 
consequential than the first two criteria.94  As the Pireno Court 
explained, “We may assume that the challenged peer review practices 
need not be denied the . . . exemption solely because they involve 
parties outside the insurance industry.  But the involvement of such 
parties, even if not dispositive, constitutes part of the inquiry 
mandated by the Royal Drug analysis.”95  It is fair to suggest that, if a 
market allocation scheme involves an entity not in the business of 
providing insurance, there is a decreased likelihood that the scheme 
will benefit from the exemption, particularly if the scheme has 
anticompetitive effects in noninsurance markets.96 
In Blue Cross, the BCBSA, which the court characterized as a trade 
association that does not underwrite insurance policies, was named as 
a participant in the market allocation scheme, and the District Court 
of Maryland examined whether BCBSA’s involvement would detract 
from an argument that the scheme was exempt.  The court held that it 
did not.97  The court believed that BCBSA was “intimately related” to 
the insurance companies because it was a nonstock, nonprofit 
 
93 Garot Anderson Mktg., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 772 F. Supp. 1054, 
1063 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
94 Blue Cross, 620 F. Supp. at 918 (“[T]he court notes that this last criterion should be 
given somewhat less weight than the previous two.”). 
95 Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 133 (1982) (“Arrangements 
between insurance companies and parties outside the insurance industry . . . may prove 
contrary to the spirit as well as the letter of [the MFA exemption], because they have the 
potential to restrain competition in noninsurance markets.”). 
96 See id. 
97 Blue Cross, 620 F. Supp. at 919. 
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association composed of local BCBS plans and because it performs a 
number of functions, including negotiating the federal employee 
program and performing various trade association functions, such as 
education, representation, and support services for its members.98  It 
held that “BCBSA is sufficiently related to the insurance company 
parties to be considered an entity in the insurance industry.”99  The 
court was not dissuaded by the fact that the BCBSA does not actually 
underwrite insurance policies. 
4.  Is Market Allocation, Generally, the “Business of Insurance”? In 
Particular, Is the BCBS Scheme? 
Both the Blue Cross holding and the Owens dissent illustrate the 
degree to which judges have eschewed bright lines in ruling 
categorically on whether market allocation, generally, is within or 
outside the scope of the MFA exemption.100  If the dicta found in 
these opinions can be cobbled together to stand for any proposition, it 
is that courts will examine the facts underlying the question of 
whether market allocation is the business of insurance at a level of 
granularity that makes categorical prediction next to impossible.  This 
is perhaps as the drafters of the MFA intended, having used 
exceedingly broad language in the applicable portion of the statute 
without taking any steps to define it.101  It is certainly in keeping with 
dissenting Judge Sloviter’s admonition in Owens that the business of 
insurance requirement demands a full factual inquiry before it can be 
definitively applied.102  The few judges who have undertaken this 
inquiry with respect to market allocation schemes seem inclined to 
think they are not the business of insurance, but they took pains to 
allow arguments to the contrary unless, as in Garot Anderson, such 
arguments were not sufficiently made.  Their approach seems to 
afford great deference to the complexities of, and their own 
unfamiliarity with, the economics of the insurance industry. 
As Pireno and Royal Drug make clear, the crux of the analysis 




100 Id. at 917–18; Owens v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 654 F.2d 218, 234–47 (3d Cir. 
1981) (Sloviter, J., dissenting). 
101 See 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2006). 
102 Owens, 654 F.2d at 247 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). 
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truly related (or is “related positively”103) to the transfer or spreading 
of risk and the policy relationship between insurer and insured, or if it 
is better classified as an insurer cost-savings measure, the benefits of 
which do not directly inure to the policyholder.  If any of the 
participants in the market allocation scheme are not in the business of 
underwriting insurance policies (particularly if the market allocation 
scheme also has potentially anticompetitive effects in a noninsurance 
market) then the scheme’s likelihood of receiving protection under 
the exemption is decreased, though not altogether eliminated. 
Garot Anderson and Blue Cross, both of which were decided in the 
summary judgment phase, pose an interesting contrast.  Confronted 
with what it characterized as a paltry evidentiary showing by 
defendants as to the first two Pireno criteria, the Garot Anderson 
court had little difficulty in casting market allocation outside the 
scope of the business of insurance.104  Yet, confronted with a 
complex evidentiary showing replete with testimony from multiple 
experts and, importantly, an argument that market allocation is 
intertwined with ratemaking (which the Garot Anderson defendants 
apparently failed to make), the Blue Cross court found it necessary to 
exercise perhaps excessive caution by denying both parties’ motions 
for summary judgment.105 
The Garot Anderson court likely had it right, and the Blue Cross 
court erred in failing to rule for the State.  Indeed, commentators have 
suggested that the two cases should be read together to assume that 
the question of whether market allocation is exempt has been 
sufficiently answered in the negative.106  Although this 
 
103 Blue Cross, 620 F. Supp. at 917. 
104 See Garot Anderson Mktg., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 772 F. Supp. 
1054, 1060–61 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
105 Blue Cross, 620 F. Supp. at 922. 
106 See, e.g., James M. Burns, Insurer Relationships with Third Parties—Agents, 
Brokers and Providers: The Antitrust Issues (May 17, 2006), available at http://www 
.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-ins/pdf/05-17-06/burns-james-05-17-06.pdf 
(“Agreements among competing insurers or agents to allocate customers along territorial 
or product lines are not McCarran exempt and have been held to constitute per se unlawful 
conduct.”).  Likewise, in a report on the scope of the MFA to the House Committee on 
Financial Services, the U.S. General Accounting Office divided agreements among 
insurers not related to ratemaking conduct into categories of exempt and nonexempt, and it 
listed agreements between insurers to allocate markets among the nonexempt.  U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 38, at 4, 26 (concluding that courts have denied antitrust 
immunity in cases involving agreements between insurers to allocate markets but noting 
that the Blue Cross court found there were material factual issues on the question of 
whether market allocation was the business of insurance).  And in an exhaustive, recently 
issued opinion where defendant insurers asserted the MFA as a defense to allegations that 
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characterization might hold true under future facts, at present it is 
more accurate to suggest that the sparse case law leans toward 
answering in the negative but ultimately remains indeterminate.  
Garot Anderson stands for the proposition that a market allocation 
scheme, with no evidence that the scheme accomplishes risk 
spreading and no argument that its affect on ratemaking makes it 
integral to the policy relationship between insurer and insured, is not 
the business of insurance.  But the Blue Cross court’s denial of both 
parties’ motions for summary judgment suggests that a market 
allocation scheme, coupled with plausible expert testimony, could be 
the business of insurance.  No other cases refute this latter 
proposition.  And because the BCBS scheme in particular was the 
backdrop against which this proposition was formed, we cannot be 
clear on whether it is the business of insurance and thus exempt under 
the MFA. 
Blue Cross is the only extant federal court opinion addressing 
whether the BCBS national market allocation scheme, specifically, is 
the business of insurance, and its holding is cryptic.  Although clearly 
siding with the State, the court refused to grant the State’s partial 
summary judgment motion.107  As to the first Pireno criterion, the 
court suggested that the defendants’ arguments attempting to 
reconcile the BCBS scheme with the spreading of risk were too 
attenuated, but it decided that those same arguments could prove 
sufficient upon further factual inquiry.108  The court also 
affirmatively concluded that the defendants’ allocation of markets 
was “one step removed” from being integral to the policy relationship 
between insurer and insured, but at the same time, it determined it 
could not rule on the second Pireno criterion.109  The court cited 
insufficient and contradictory evidence on whether the conduct in 
question affected ratemaking, which in turn could have affected the 
insurer-insured relationship.110  Finally, on the third Pireno criterion, 
the court held that the BCBSA was an entity in the insurance industry, 
 
they conspired not to compete for customers in violation of the Sherman Act, the Third 
Circuit cited frequently and often approvingly to the dissent in Owens, analogizing the 
facts of its case to the market allocation allegations in Owens and holding that the conduct 
in question was not the business of insurance for failing to meet the second Pireno 
criterion.  In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2010). 
107 Blue Cross, 620 F. Supp. at 922. 
108 See id. at 917. 
109 Id. at 918. 
110 Id. 
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and thus the conduct was sufficiently limited to entities in the 
insurance industry.111 
In the same year that the State of Maryland brought its claim 
leading to the Blue Cross opinion, the State of Ohio brought a 
separate but nearly identical action in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio.  In Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n v. 
Community Mutual Insurance Co., the Ohio Attorney General 
accused the BCBSA and two BCBS member plans of violating 
section 1 of the Sherman Act by allocating markets pursuant to the 
BCBS national market allocation scheme.112  The Ohio case never 
generated a published opinion and the Maryland case never garnered 
any further opinions because both cases were settled on similar terms 
through consent judgments.113  The attorneys general were able to 
extract commitments from the defendants not to enforce the exclusive 
territorial provisions pursuant to the BCBSA licensing agreement in 
their respective states.114 
B.  The “Regulated by State Law” Requirement 
Even if an activity satisfies all three Pireno criteria and therefore 
constitutes “the business of insurance,” the activity must nonetheless 
be regulated by state law in order to be exempt under the MFA.  The 
state regulation requirement is notable primarily for the ease with 
which it is met.  If the requirement were more stringent, much of the 
MFA exemption might be superfluous, in as much as it would be 
subsumed within the state action doctrine, which immunizes activity 
that antitrust laws might prevent when a state has articulated an 
express policy to displace the federal competition laws and when it 
actively supervises the conduct at issue.115 
 
111 Id. at 918–19.  As noted in Pireno, the court could have held that BCBSA was not 
an entity in the insurance industry without foreclosing the availability of the exemption.  It 
chose instead to recognize BCBSA as an entity in the industry, notwithstanding its not 
having underwritten insurance policies.  The court also failed to address the related 
question of whether BCBSA’s involvement in the scheme had any potential to affect 
competition in noninsurance markets.  Still, the court at least was clear in finding for the 
defendants on the third criterion. 
112 See 5 HEALTH CARE & ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 15. 
113 See id. 
114 Id. 
115 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 
(1980); HOVENKAMP, supra note 33, at 732 (“Importantly, ‘regulated by state law’ for 
McCarran purposes means much less than the kind of state regulation necessary to qualify 
for the ‘state action’ immunity . . . .”). 
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Put simply, “If a state statute can be read as directly or indirectly 
regulating an aspect of the ‘business of insurance,’ this second 
requirement [under the MFA] is met.”116  Thus, while it is very 
unlikely that any state will have enacted any regulation specifically 
encouraging the allocation of insurance markets, the state regulation 
requirement is nonetheless met if the state has merely acted to 
regulate any other aspect of the business of insurance.117  A state 
insurance commissioner or other state agency must merely have 
jurisdiction and authority over the conduct in question.118  For 
example, courts have held that a state unfair insurance practices act, 
which prevents unfair or deceptive practices in the insurance business, 
is sufficient to trigger MFA protection for purposes of the state 
regulation requirement.119  As of 1992, the House Judiciary 
Committee reported that not a single court had ever held any form of 
state regulation insufficient to trigger the MFA antitrust exemption.120 
An insurer seeking cover under the MFA exemption has two 
primary obstacles to consider in meeting the state regulation 
requirement: the consequences of interstate conduct and the 
consequences of conduct involving foreign participants.  In 1960, the 
Supreme Court held that, where interstate conduct is concerned, the 
state regulation must be applicable in the state where the conduct is 
practiced and its impact felt.121  Thus, if a Nebraska insurer doing 
business in Virginia sought MFA protection for conduct practiced and 
felt in Virginia, a Nebraska statute governing the conduct would be 
insufficient to meet the state regulation requirement.122 
Given the widespread regulation of insurance throughout most U.S. 
states, perhaps the only serious threat to the exemption posed by the 
state regulation requirement is the involvement of foreign actors.  The 
state regulation requirement demands that participants in the conduct 
 
116 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN 
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 729–30 (2000). 
117 See Owens v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 654 F.2d 218, 244–45 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding 
that the state regulation requirement was met where the State of New Jersey had evidenced 
its intent to occupy the insurance business field); HOVENKAMP, supra note 33, at 732 
(“[The state] need only pass a statute that purports to regulate.”). 
118 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INSURANCE ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 25 (2d ed. 
2006). 
119 Id. at 26. 
120 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-1036, at 27 (1992)). 
121 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Travelers Health Ass’n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960). 
122 Id. 
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be within the jurisdictional reach of the applicable state.123  Thus, 
where a market allocation scheme involves foreign actors, the scheme 
might lose the exemption for failing to meet the state regulation 
requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
It is obvious that courts have struggled mightily in determining 
whether market allocation is exempt from federal antitrust scrutiny 
under the MFA, particularly in determining whether it can satisfy the 
business of insurance requirement.  While a categorical conclusion 
from the courts that market allocation is or is not exempt is not 
impossible, existing case law suggests it is unlikely.  If clarity is to 
come at all, it would likely have to come from legislative changes to 
the MFA. 
Without more, this would be a very minor problem.  In the sixty-
five-year history of the statute, the number of federal antitrust 
challenges to insurer market allocation schemes that were met with an 
MFA defense can be counted on one hand.  But the BCBS national 
market allocation scheme lends the problem tremendous gravity.  
Indeed, it may lend the problem central relevance to the national 
health care debate, which has turned largely on how rising health 
insurance costs can be addressed. 
BCBS health insurance companies insure one of every three 
Americans,124 and together they dominate the U.S. health insurance 
market.  Yet, through the BCBSA, which they control,125 BCBS 
companies have managed to avoid competition with one another by 
allocating markets geographically for most of the eighty-year history 
of the BCBS concept.  It is true that, on balance, this arrangement 
might be procompetitive, and BCBSA has argued that its territorial 
divisions help it protect its intellectual property and prevent free 
riding.126  But there is also evidence that Blue-on-Blue competition 
would inure to the benefit of consumers.127 
At a minimum, repealing the MFA would remove a primary 
obstacle preventing interested BCBS plans from expanding their 
 
123 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
124 History of Blue Cross Blue Shield, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD ASS’N, http://www 
.bcbs.com/about/history (last visited Feb. 10, 2011). 
125 See supra note 13. 
126 See supra Part II.A. 
127 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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market share at the expense of other BCBS plans.  As the situation in 
central Pennsylvania128 and a few other states, including California, 
North Carolina, Ohio, and Virginia, makes clear, certain BCBS 
companies have shown a willingness to compete with other BCBS 
companies.  Of course, in other regions, it may be in the best interest 
of individual BCBS plans to maintain a system of regional 
monopolies over the cachet that comes with the BCBS name and 
symbols, even absent a formal agreement to allocate markets.  Thus, 
to induce nationwide Blue-on-Blue competition, more than a repeal of 
the MFA exemption may be required.  Perhaps a legal action 
demonstrating a continuing agreement not to compete between Blues 
in adjacent markets could lead a court to issue a mandatory injunction 
requiring mutual market entries, although this calls to mind the ease 





128 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
